Congestion on fishing grounds and overfishlng have convinced fishermen, economists, and most governments of the necessity to control access to fishing grounds. The living resources of the sea, however, present partlcularifies which may make the task of redefining International fishing rights more difficult than that of distributing claims to mineral resources.
W
'ho owns the riches of the high seas? What countries should mine the mineral resources of the ocean and harvest its living resources? To decide on these questions, the United Nations convened in Caracas, Venezuela, June 20 -August 29, the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea. From the outset it was clear that the allotted time was too short to agree upon a new international law and the Conference will continue in Geneva in March 1975. The answers that it ultimately gives will allocate vast resources to international institutions or to certain national states and redistribute income between consumers and producers.
Alternative Distributions of Rshlng Rights
This article discusses some efficiency and equity aspects of redefining international fishing rights. The value of the sea's living resources is insignificant compared to its mineral resources. The living resources, however, present two particularities which may make the task of distributing fishing rights more difficult than that of distributing claims to mineral resources. Firstly, the living resources are geographically mobile and part of the sensitive ecosystem of the oceans whereas mineral resources are stationary. Secondly, the living resources have been exploited for many centuries, while the mineral resources have just started to be mined. A system of common law has developed during these centuries and forms the basis of the existing location of the world fishing industry. Thus, redefining ownership rights to the living resources of the seas will effect fishermen and fishing villages around the world. They will face a major adjustment process aggravated by a demand for fishery products that grows more slowly than the demand for mineral products.
Fishing rights on the high seas can be distributed in different ways: [] One way is to distribute ownership rights to the seas among national states. Such claims have traditionally been distributed in proportion to the coastal length of each nation. Other criteria are, of course, conceivable. Nation states could claim sovereignty over the oceans in proportion to their land mass, to their population, or to their population density, etc. Within the area claimed, the government of the nation state has exercised complete sovereignty and has allocated fishing rights to fishermen. Customarily it has favored its own nationals and excluded foreign fishermen from its territorial waters.
[] An alternative way is to endow an international authority with property rights over international waters. This authority could then i.a. distribute fishing rights to fishermen without discriminating between countries.
For two centuries most states have accepted the principle of the freedom of the high seas. However, an international authority has never been endowed with the property rights not claimed by them. Practical reasons explain this. Thus, no state was able to patrol and effectively control waters beyond the range of its fire-arms. Furthermore, the apparently inexhaustible riches of the seas made fishing rights a free good and rendered property rights over them valueless. The high seas therefore became free to all. In each century the claims of nation states reflected the firing range of their cannons and the degree of competition on the fishing grounds.
Today, the international community faces a radically different situation. The development of technology has made it both possible and profitable for a nation to claim property rights over wider expanses of the high seas. The development of weapon technology allows a country to police ever larger areas. Technological developments in fishing fleets and equipment are adopted by more and more countries and increase competition.
Extension of Territorial Limits
Congestion on fishing grounds and overfishing have convinced fishermen, economists and most governments of the necessity to control access to 9 Researcher at the Institute for International Economic Studies, University of Stockholm.
fishing grounds. Freedom of the seas in the sense of free access to fishery grounds belongs to the past. But control over a scarce resource possesses economic value. He who exercises this control in effect pockets a revenue from selling "admission tickets" to high sea fisheries. The basic question of the Third Conference is whom should be given control over access to the fishing grounds and how should it be exercised.
Substantial economic amounts are involved. Most territorial limits now extend 6 nautical miles offshore. Exceptions are Eastern European countries and some countries traditionally dependent on fishing which have claimed 12 nautical miles. In 1972 Iceland extended its territorial limit from 12 to 50 nautical miles while Peru and Argentine already claim 200. At Caracas wide support soon emerged for 12 mile territorial limits and 188 mile economic zones giving the coastal states control over fishing rights 200 nautical miles out from base lines. At present this appears to be a likely outcome of the Third Conference. Traditional fishing nations will vote for it in order to protect their coastal fishermen. Some less developed countries (LDCs) will vote for it to protect their infant fishing industry from foreign competition. Most of the major long distance fishing nations (USA, USSR, Japan) which are worst hit will accept it in exchange for unchanged sailing rights for their navies in the 100 international straights that thereby become territorial waters. This is neither an efficient nor an equitable distribution of fishing rights. Towards the end of the Conference realization grew that such a solution did not sufficiently protect the interests of "geographically disadvantaged countries", i.e. countries with no or little coast bordering on rich fishing grounds, and that assistance to LDCs and the conservation of fishing stock could be better achieved in other ways. Below I shall argue that an appropriate international authority could protect fishing stocks more efficiently than national governments. I shall also suggest that such an authority need not change the distribution of income between fishing nations as drastically as would the extension of fishing limits to 200 nautical miles.
The Conservationist Argument
Extension of fishing limits is often presented by coastal states as necessary to prevent overfishing. When access to fishing grounds is open to all, an individual fisherman certainly lacks sufficient incentive to leave fish for replenishment of the stock. What he leaves one day may be caught by others the next, and he will not sow if he cannot harvest the fruits of his work. Consequently, too many fishermen, competing with each other to exploit the common pool of living resources in the sea, threaten to deplete it. Private property rights are necessary to conserve fishing stocks but cannot be exercised over the fish themselves. Fish are more difficult to mark than reindeerl Instead it is said the national governments must exercise property rights to the fishing grounds. According to this line of reasoning, appropriate conservation measures require that national governments have exclusive fishing rights.
Extended territorial limits or economic zones are, however, not a necessary -or even a sufficient -condition for conservation of fishing stocks. They are not necessary because access to fishing grounds can be controlled by international institutions as well as by national governments. They are not sufficient if fishing stocks do not stay within the domain of one national government throughout their whole life cycle. Thus international control is an alternative way to con, serve fishing stocks and a better way if they migrate.
Most living resources of the seas migrate. Tuna fish, eels, salmon, herring, whales, to name a few, cover vast distances in their migrations in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Over half of the world's annual fish catch consists of migratory species (herring, salmon, whales, and the less migratory cod). With the exception of certain unit stocks of cod, many species will cross fishing limits of up to 200 nautical miles.
Control of Ecosystems
An additional argument which favors international rather than national control of fishing access is the dependence of the species on the ecosystem of the oceans. Sea creatures are part of a long feed chain. Seals eat salmon and salmon eat herring and herring eat plankton. The Icelandic cod which sticks to one country's domain is dependent on herring which migrates. Even control of stationary fishing stocks is therefore not completely possible without control of whole ecosystems. Since ecosystems transcend the domains of national states, so must the jurisdiction of the control institutions.
This ecosystem is being increasingly damaged by industrial waste. Atomic energy plants raise the temperature of coastal waters and change the migratory paths of fish. Oil discharges destroy the life in the oceans as do estuaries spewing pollutants into them. Jacques-Yves Cousteau has said: "A toxic product thrown into the sea anywhere on earth spreads throughout the oceans in a few years." Damages to the ecosystem are the concern of all countries when the repercussions spread through the whole system.
